On this day 27 December in 1941, John Curtin famously declared that in the war with Imperial Japan, Australia would look to the United States, ‘free of any pangs as to our traditional links or kinship with the United Kingdom’. In our national mythology, this is seen as Australia acting independently, instead of following Britain’s lead. However, Curtin had little choice but to appeal desperately for US military assistance, as Australia could not defend itself, and could not rely upon Britain, which was fighting for its life against Nazi Germany.
Curtin’s plea to the US was also calculated. He knew that Australia would be a crucial base for future US operations against Imperial Japan. He wanted Australia to have a say in the conduct of these operations. First, however, Australia would have to be defended. Curtin played on the fact that it was in the interests of the US to defend Australia as its vital southern base in the war.
In 1944, after the danger had passed, Curtin tried to resuscitate the idea of ‘imperial defence’, whereby Britain, Australia, and the other self-governing dominions would better co–ordinate their defence strategies. As such, Curtin’s ‘look to America’ was not the foundation stone of the Australia-US alliance, as the mythmakers would have us believe. Those foundations were not laid until 1951, with the signing of the ANZUS Treaty.
There is another myth: namely, that the US came to Australia’s aid out of feelings of kinship. This is not true. The US had a thoroughly unsentimental view of Australia’s strategic utility. MacArthur said as much on 1 June 1942, in confidential remarks that were recorded for posterity. He said that the US had a vital interest in securing Australia as a base, and not defending it on the basis of who inhabited the continent (see Peter Edwards, ‘From Curtin to Beazley: Labor Leaders and the American Alliance’, the John Curtin Prime Ministerial Library, 8 October 2001).
As an aside, had ‘Australia’ instead been three separate European nations, say of British, French, and Dutch origin, and not a friendly and unified continental-sized British dominion, MacArthur’s calculations would have been very different, especially if French Australia had been aligned with Vichy France. Who inhabited the continent, which was the strategic consequence of the British settlement of Australia, did matter after all.
There are uncomfortable truths about this period of Australia’s history. In the 1930s, Australia should have better prepareditself. As Leader of the Opposition between 1935-41, Curtinhad come closest to articulating what needed to be done. However, he lost the federal elections of 1937 and 1940, and could not therefore give effect to Labor’s policy of greater defence self-reliance. Had Australia been ruthlessly clear-eyedand more self-confident in the 1930s, the national panic of 1941-42 could have been avoided. Had Australia rearmed in time, it could have deployed a powerful force in its sea-air approaches, which could have disrupted Imperial Japan’s attempts to project force through present-day East Timor, Papua New Guinea, Solomon Islands, and Indonesia (in the latter case, in co–operation with Free Dutch forces). Had Australia ‘looked to America’ sooner, combined US-Australian planning for the defence of Australia could have been undertaken before the war.
Just as Australia was found wanting strategically, it was also unprepared at home. In December 1941, Australia was not yeton a full war footing, despite having been at war for over two years. Curtin argued that as Australia was now inside ‘the firing lines’, its way of life had to be revolutionised, through an ‘all-in’ effort. Production of war material would have to be increased dramatically. Drastic austerity would have to be enforced. He would often say ‘it’s fight and work…or perish’.
Curtin was critical of the ‘lackadaisical Australian mind’. By this, he did not call into question the patriotism of Australians, or their sense of duty. He called these ‘ever present qualities’. What concerned him were the particulars of the task—the specifics that would be involved in mobilising ‘dormant talents’ and ‘untapped resources’, something that would require leadership and direction from the government, andservice and sacrifice from the people.
The Curtin of 1941 was a hard patriot. He was stern, puritanical, and critical of half-hearted effort. In his youth, he had been a radical socialist, convinced that capitalism would inevitably collapse on the road to socialism, when there would be no nations, no militarism, and no war. In the 1920s, he began to better appreciate that the parliamentary path—and not socialist revolution—was the best hope for social improvement. While he was the editor of the Westralian Worker (1917-28), Curtin became a vocal Australian patriot, as he wrote about the ‘dignity of Australian nationhood’, and his pride in Australia’s history and its accomplishments.
He did not see any contradiction in Australia acting more independently, while still retaining its dominion status, and its ties with the ‘mother country’. Curtin would have been puzzled by the tendency today on the part of some to engage in self-denunciation of our settler-colonial origins and history. While he thought that Australia should ratify the 1931 Statute of Westminster so as to achieve legal independence from the UK parliament (this was done in October 1942, with retroactive effect as at 3 September 1939), it would not have crossed his mind to cut ties with Britain, the Empire, or the Crown.
Curtin had a largeness of mind and a strength of character thatallowed him to grasp and act on the uncomfortable reality of circumstances that did not suit his preferred political agendaof social reform. From the mid-1930s, he recognised that the times would require him to champion a different cause, which was one that did not come naturally, either to him or his party—namely how best to defend Australia in a war in the Pacific, at a time when the prevailing orthodoxy was to rely on Britain, operating from its base in Singapore.
Curtin’s legacy puts the lie to today’s conventional wisdom that the Left should avoid engaging on matters of warbecause, so the argument goes, this plays to the strengths of the Right. Curtin would have seen this as an appalling abrogation of responsibility. He spoke of patriotism and of war, using the language of duty, service, and sacrifice. Were he alive today, the modern Left would criticise him for ‘beating the drums of war’. However, Curtin was of an olderLeft. Like Clement Attlee, he saw no contradiction between socialism and the patriotic love of country. George Orwellwas also in this tradition, and in 1941 wrote the great essay that squared patriotism and socialism, ‘The Lion and the Unicorn: Socialism and the English Genius’.
Those who would seek to appropriate Curtin’s legacy in a performative display to demonstrate their credibility on defence issues cannot limit their appreciation to admiring only what he did as wartime leader, once the existential danger to Australia and its political independence was apparent. To do so would be to ignore the inconvenient truth of his legacy. To honour Curtin, we have widen the lens and examine the totality of his thought and policies, and then ask ourselves what a modern-day Curtin would make of our precarious strategic environment (said to be the worst in 80 years), and what he would do about it.
Here is an attempt to properly honour Curtin in this way. A modern-day Curtin would be vocal about the threat posed by China. He would argue for greater defence self-reliance, and for at least 3 per cent of GDP to be spent on defence. He would be concerned about the threat of long-range missile and air attack, offensive cyber strikes, raids in remote areas, attacks on undersea infrastructure and so on. He would insist on the development of effective military solutions to these and other, similar problems. While a champion of defence self-reliance, he would recognise that a new ‘look to America’ would be necessary. He would argue for ANZUS to be put on to an operational footing, with a standing headquarters (this time headed by an Australian), to command a combined Australia-US force. He would be a supporter of AUKUS, butwould be focused on realising rapid benefits, arguing that anycapability pay-offs in the 2030s and beyond would not matter much if we lose a war in the meantime. He would give priority to home defence, mobilisation planning, and boosting local defence production. He would support universal national service for the defence of Australia.
On Curtin’s gravestone is carved the following:
‘His country was his pride/His brother man his cause’.
This epitaph captures his patriotism and his socialism. Curtin recognised that being prepared to fight a war is the price that has to be paid for preserving freedom, democracy, and sovereignty, and protecting the nation, which is the best vehicle that exists for social improvement. We do not need the Curtin myths. The hard truths of his legacy serve us better.
