U.S. President-elect Donald Trump has made his disdain for the United States’ international commitments abundantly clear. Throughout his first term, he condemned multilateral institutions and railed against what he depicted as an unaccountable, “globalist” elite. He withdrew from key agreements, such as the Paris climate accord, and disengaged from organizations that form the backbone of the liberal international order. True to his populist ethos, he chafed against constraints imposed by multilateralism, preferring instead to put “America first.”
Trump is one of many ascendant populists who emphasize inward-looking policies and challenge global cooperation. The French politician Marine Le Pen, for example, has proclaimed that she is “for local, against global.” Hungarian leader Viktor Orban rallies his supporters with a cry of “Hungary first.” Yet Trump’s position as president of the United States—the largest funder and primary backer of numerous international organizations—makes his antagonism uniquely consequential.
Many observers anticipate that Trump will be even more emboldened and organized when he attempts to reshape the global order in his second term. He has openly threatened to exit, undermine, or radically renegotiate Washington’s commitments to institutions such as the World Trade Organization (WTO), NATO, and even the United Nations. Trump’s nascent plan to levy new tariffs on Canada and Mexico threatens to undo the U.S.-Mexico-Canada Agreement. Attacking these institutions is central to his goal of sidelining the practice of multilateralism in favor of one in which states act largely alone. Should this vision materialize, the ripple effects could destabilize an already fragile international system.
The stakes could hardly be higher. Humanity faces an array of transnational challenges that no single country can resolve alone. Climate change, pandemics, economic inequality, artificial intelligence, and other existential risks demand international responses. Indeed, Trump’s proposed retrenchment from global organizations could not have come at a worse time.
But international institutions do not have to passively accept their fate. They have agency and the capacity for self-preservation. They can adapt to Trump by working around him, appeasing him, secretly working with him, or appealing to his supporters. If international organizations learn to bend instead of break, they can save themselves. If they don’t, governments will lose the infrastructure through which they work together on the world’s toughest problems.
THE ANTIGLOBALIST AGENDA
Trump can undermine international organizations in many ways. Most directly, he could pull the United States out of key bodies or agreements. In his first term, for instance, Trump withdrew from the Paris climate accord, UNESCO, and the UN Human Rights Council because he saw them as anathema to his “America first” agenda. He could exit more organizations in his second administration; he has been especially critical of the World Health Organization (WHO) and the World Trade Organization (WTO).
More subtly, Trump could disengage from international organizations by neglecting to comply with their rules, refusing to attend critical meetings, or obstructing key agenda items. During his first term, Trump successfully sabotaged the WTO by refusing to confirm nominees to its appellate body, severely limiting its ability to enforce trade rules. Such noncompliance is destabilizing in and of itself, given that Washington is the most powerful government in the world and often a leader in international organizations. But it could also have dangerous knock-on effects. Institutions depend on mutual trust, and if the United States flouts the rules, others may follow suit—eroding the foundations of global cooperation.
Trump might also manipulate or withhold vital information from these bodies, which depend on accurate data from member states to function effectively. The World Bank, for example, needs economic metrics, the WHO relies on public health statistics, and environmental agencies require data on carbon emissions. By refusing to share such information—or providing false reports—the Trump administration could hamstring these institutions. More simply, Trump could withhold money. The United States is the largest funder of numerous organizations, and without Washington’s money, many would struggle to survive. When the Trump administration defunded the WHO during the COVID-19 pandemic, it hobbled the institution’s response to the crisis and eroded the WHO’s reputation worldwide.
Trump could also undercut existing organizations by starting competing ones. These rival entities, designed to drain their counterparts of resources and influence, would serve as platforms for grandstanding rather than substantive cooperation. Much like regional institutions backed by other populist leaders—such as the New Development Bank, which was started, in part, by Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi—these bodies could provide the United States with a veneer of multilateral engagement while taking away business from the existing institutions that do more substantive work.
Finally, Trump could attempt to co-opt international organizations to align with his administration’s agenda by focusing their resources on narrow U.S. priorities or leveraging their legitimacy to pursue policies that serve domestic political goals instead of broader global interests. Such a strategy could effectively weaponize these institutions, turning them into instruments of unilateralism rather than forums for global collaboration. China, for instance, has used its control of the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank to pursue its domestic interests while benefiting from the legitimacy of the institution’s diverse membership.
GETTING CRAFTY
Thankfully, international organizations are not powerless in the face of these threats. In fact, they have many tools and techniques to protect themselves from a populist in the White House. Perhaps the most basic is working to minimize U.S. influence, specifically by looking for resources elsewhere. When the first Trump administration withheld energy-related data from the World Bank, the organization signed information-sharing agreements with Arab multilateral development banks. Similarly, the UN expanded its capacity to acquire data on its own, such as through surveillance drones, which it deploys during peacekeeping operations. In doing so, it has become less reliant on governments for intelligence.
Having a broad network of partners—including companies, charities, think tanks, and other multilateral institutions—can help make an organization more resilient. UNICEF, for example, has successfully worked with the multinational company Unilever to secure funding and expertise. The World Bank has done the same with the Gates Foundation. Multilateral institutions should improve their ability to share data securely with one another to improve coordination. Local governments can also be valuable allies. When Trump withdrew from the Paris climate accord, UN officials worked with U.S. states such as California and cities such as New York to maintain climate commitments and preserve dialogue.
International organizations can save themselves.
International organizations can also get around Trump by becoming more bureaucratically flexible. WTO members came up with the Multi-Party Interim Appeal Arbitration Arrangement, a stopgap forum to arbitrate trade disputes, to circumvent obstacles put in place by the Trump administration. Similarly, the Paris accord’s voluntary and scalable commitments helped sustain momentum even after the United States exited the deal in 2017.
If working around Trump is infeasible (or even if it isn’t), groups can look for ways to force him to remain in their organizations by raising the exit costs. For instance, embedding withdrawal penalties—such as the sanctions clauses the European Union installs in many trade agreements—can deter treaty abrogation. Lengthy withdrawal processes, such as the one-year delay required under the Paris accord, provide time for domestic opposition to mobilize or for political leadership to change.
International bodies should also make it easy for countries to rejoin. UNESCO, for example, swiftly welcomed the United States back after Trump left office. The Biden administration was similarly able to quickly rejoin the Paris accord—the process required only his signature.
IF YOU CAN’T BEAT THEM
Another approach to surviving Trump is appeasement, which can involve offering the United States material benefits or expanding U.S. influence within an organization. This strategy comes with downsides: taken too far, it can sacrifice institutional legitimacy and raise accusations of bias. But there are ways to walk a fine line. Consider, for example, how NATO fared during Trump’s first four years in office. When Trump criticized NATO allies for spending too little on defense, Secretary-General Jens Stoltenberg encouraged allies to modestly increase their military budgets and publicly credited Trump for the changes, appealing to his ego. The approach appeared to work. Trump did not pull the United States out of NATO—as he had repeatedly threatened—and instead took credit for allies’ bigger defense budgets.
Multilateral institutions can also informally recalibrate their agendas to align, at least superficially, with Trump’s priorities. By focusing on issues such as trade fairness or counterterrorism—areas in which Trump has shown interest—international organizations can demonstrate their utility to him. For example, NATO has sought to mollify Turkey’s populist president, Recep Tayyip Erdogan, by paying lip service to the fight against terrorism, a big concern for him.
For organizations wary of escalating tensions with Trump, retrenchment is another solution. Institutions can minimize their exposure to populist ire while maintaining credibility by narrowing their focus to core functions and avoiding controversial areas. For example, the WTO has historically exercised judicial restraint on politically sensitive issues, and the World Bank has often rolled out reforms incrementally, in cooperation with resistant governments. Similarly, organizations may emphasize temporary or informal adjustments to policies, retaining the ability to reverse course as political conditions change. Such flexibility offers these institutions a way to work with populists without undermining their broader missions.
International institutions can also use regional organizations, such as South America’s Mercosur or the African Union, as intermediaries to get around Trump. Many regional organizations do not include the United States as a member, and those that do tend to fly under Trump’s radar, such as the Inter-American Development Bank. There are other benefits, too. Governments in the global South often see these smaller organizations as less intrusive and more sympathetic to their concerns than global ones. Many World Bank projects are cofinanced with regional development banks that have strong ties to member governments and can usually get more buy-in from recipient countries.
PUBLIC RELATIONS
International organizations have long relied on public support to sustain their work, but in recent years they have struggled to court the masses as populist leaders have stirred up antiglobalist resentment. Confronting the incoming president’s hostility thus requires not only engaging him directly but also finding ways to manage his supporters. That will sometimes require discreet, behind-the-scenes diplomacy. By working covertly, international organizations can allow Trump to quietly reap the benefits of multilateralism—economic growth, better security, and access to critical technical expertise—while shielding him from the political costs.
Many organizations already do a good job at affording secrecy to their members. The UN Security Council frequently conducts closed-door meetings on sensitive issues, ensuring that frank discussions can take place without public scrutiny. Similarly, the International Monetary Fund classifies the positions expressed by member states during board meetings for up to seven years. And the WTO redacts adjudication documents to protect proprietary or politically sensitive information.
Building effective secrecy mechanisms, however, requires significant investments in technology, infrastructure, and bureaucratic capacity. Encryption tools, secure communication channels, and data storage are essential to maintaining the confidentiality of sensitive discussions. Multilateral organizations may also need clear protocols outlining who can access confidential materials, under what circumstances, and for how long. This might involve granting clearance to select staff, contracting with specialized cybersecurity firms, or enhancing internal information technology capabilities. Although advancements in technology have made such solutions more accessible, they also expose organizations to new risks, including cyberattacks and leaks. Addressing these vulnerabilities is important to ensuring confidentiality.
Organizations that do not want to work around Trump voters might try appealing to them directly. Populist leaders denounce international organizations as elite driven and out of touch. But if these institutions more effectively communicate the benefits they provide to everyday people or align their messaging with populist rhetoric, they make multilateralism harder to vilify. In 2020, for example, UN Secretary-General António Guterres thanked Trump for his engagement with UN initiatives and wished him a swift recovery from COVID-19, even as the president had sought to rein in U.S. financial contributions to the UN. Trump, in turn, praised Guterres for “working hard to ‘Make the UN Great Again.’” Americans generally know little about the benefits they get from international organizations, such as lower prices on goods thanks to fewer restrictions on international trade. By better communicating their upsides, these institutions can help sustain their legitimacy and create a constituency of supporters.
STAYING ALIVE
For international organizations, strategies to weather another Trump presidency are not without risks. Trying to sideline Trump may provoke more hostility from his administration. And appeasement could lead to accusations from other member states that multilateral institutions are compromising their principles.
But both approaches are better than the alternative—doing nothing or reacting in an ad hoc fashion. The stakes are simply too high for global organizations to not be proactive. The world’s multilateral architecture is the best mechanism humanity has for confronting existential transnational threats. Allowing it to rot, weaken, or otherwise unravel would leave all countries far too vulnerable in an increasingly volatile world.
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